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Abstract 
During the EU’s progressive consolidation process, the relation between EU and national law has turned out to 
be  extremely  complex,  being  subject  both  to  a  positive  evolution,  but  also  to  a  number  of  difficulties  of 
assimilating EU norms and enforcing them in relation to national legal systems, an uniform regulation proves to 
be  necessary.  Still,  the  adequate  and  correct  enforcement of  EU  legislation  is  essential  when  it  comes  to 
maintaining the EU’s strong foundation and ensuring that European policies have the effect desired, by acting in 
favor of European citizens. The effectiveness of governance is menaced when Member States are not capable to 
enforce common rules correctly, enforcing EU legislation with delay or errors does nothing but weakening the 
European system, reducing the latter’s possibility to achieve its objectives and deprives citizens, as well as 
enterprises, from various benefits. 
At the same time, the enforcement of EU law is the duty of all Member States. Any state has the duty to enforce 
EU law, as well as the liability for its transgression, no matter which is the state authority, central or local, 
which committed the violation. The important role played by EU law – the observance of which must be insured 
both by Europeans institutions and national jurisdictions – imposes on every state the duty to order the most 
suitable methods of guaranteeing the observance of community law by its public collectivities. 
Keywords: EU law, national law, enforcement of EU legislation, national competencies, autonomy 
Introduction
The present paper proposes to analyse one of the EU’s law principal subjects, namely its 
enforcement by the national authorities of the Member States, in accordance with the latest case-law 
developments regarding this issue. We also take into consideration the fact that the Member States’ 
role in the enforcement of the European legislation has a specific description in Treaty of Lisboa. For 
the first time, this treaty emphasis on the fact that the Member States’ competence is a principle 
competence, thus EU could interfere if only a uniform regulation proves to be necessary . Equally, 
according  to  the  constant  case  law  of  Court  of  Justice  this  competence  is  not  only  a  simple 
prerogative but a genuine obligation which makes the Member States to be considered as titulars of 
the EU’s executive function. 
The Member States’ cooperation regarding the enforcement of EU’s law may consist in a 
normative,  judiciary  or  an  administrative  action.  It can  be  a  legislative  intervention  in  order to 
complete  EU’s  law  provisions,  to  ensure  the  European  regulations’  observance  even  under  the 
compulsion of the judiciary system. But, most of the national measures bound on the EU’s executive 
function  involving  the  execution  of  the  European  decisions  by  the  national  administrative 
institutions. 
Taking into consideration the complexity of the theme and the impossibility to be analysed 
exhaustively in a few pages paper, we are to point out, especially, the methods of enforcement of the 
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EU law; we also analyse the institutional and procedural autonomy of the Member States regarding 
the enforcement of the EU law and the limitations which results from the necessity of ensuring an 
uniform  application  and  of  guaranteeing  an  effective  protection  of  the  rights  deriving  from  the 
community regulations. 
Thus, we propose to contribute to the actual considerations on this issue basing on a critical 
report of the European doctrine and case-law, especially French and Belgium doctrine and case-law, 
seeing that at the present moment, it cannot be discussed on a specific concern on this matter in the 
Romanian doctrine. 
1. The EU Member States – as titulars of the EU executive function 
Belonging to European Union involves, amongst other aspects, the necessity of conferring a 
full application of the European regulations. The legal order of the EU bases on a complementarity 
between the different levels of the authorities – the European authorities and the national ones
2. EU’s 
law does not deprive the Member States of the decision making authority but, on the contrary, these 
have an essential role in the enforcement of EU law. 
EU’s institutions and authorities dispose of enlarged competences regarding the enactment of 
measures which are compulsory for the Member States. The adopted measures have priority over the 
national provisions
3 and they also have a direct effect in the national law
4; thus the derived law is 
autonomous in comparison with international and national law, at  the  same  time. However, the 
enforcement of this law depends on the cooperation between the statal institutions. 
In  the  complex  system  of  the  EU  which  has  an  important  supranational  character,  the 
supranational bodies founded by the Member States’ will have been charged with working-out the 
legislative acts. But, the Member States preserve an enlarged power of action in the enforcement of 
the adopted regulations
5. This prerogative joined to the Union which is endowed with important 
attribution competences that are exercised by a dualist executive formed by the Council and by the 
Committee. 
Generally speaking, it can be stated that the EU’s law execution principally bases on the 
Member  States  competences  which  are  exercised  according  to  the  institutional  and  procedural 
autonomy principles developped by the community case-law
6 but, at the same time respecting the 
cooperation and loialty obligations
7. These competences can be subsidiarily  
entrusted to the Committee which exercise them basing on the Council’s delegation
8 and 
under the control of the Member States
9.
2 P. Pescatore, L’ordre juridique des Communautes europeennes. Etude des sources du droit communautaire, 
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2006), 199. 
3 Stated for the first time in 1964 in Costa/Enel Decision (Case 6/1964, Rec. p. 1141 and next). 
4 Therefore, private persons can directly invoke them in front of the national judge – CJCE, the 5
th February 
1963, Van Gend & Loss, Case 26/62, Rec. 1963, p. 1. 
5 Considering this specificity, the doctrine has qualified the EU’s legal system as being „an incomplete and 
imperfect one”. It is stated that although EU has enlarged competences, it still remains bound on its Member States 
regarding two aspects: these complete the EU’s regulations and lay at its disposal their administrative bodies and 
besides there are states which have to  use  their legal power  in  order to  ensure the execution of  the  EU  adopted 
regulations - Loïc Azoulai, „Pour un droit de l’execution de l’Union Europeenne”, in L’execution du droit de l’Union, 
entre mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, ed. Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, (Bruxelles: Bruylant 
2009),  2-3; Jacqueline Dutheil de  la Rochere,  „Rapport  de synthese”, in Droits nationaux,  droit communautaire: 
influences croisees. En hommage a Louis Dubuis, (Paris: La documentation Francaise, 2000), 198. 
6 Which are to be detailed on the following point of the paper. 
7 On the strength of these obligations, their competences of execution must not diverge from the common rules.  
8 Under the reserve of specific cases when the Council exercises directly these competences. Treaty of Lisboa 
reforms the delegation legal proceedings, article 29 TFUE empowers the Parliament and the Council to delegate to 
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The method of enforcement the European legislation reasserts a fundamental descentralization 
principle, establishing an “executive federalism”
10 – as it has been stated in the doctrine. On the 
strength  of  it,  if  the  legislative  function  is  prevailingly  controlled  by  the  institutions,  then  the 
legislative acts’ executions falls on the Member States, on the ground of a self-competence or a 
delegated one (it concerns an exclusive community competence)
11.
The Member States’ cooperation regarding the enforcement of EU’s law may consist in a 
normative,  judiciary  or  an  administrative  action.  It can  be  a  legislative  intervention  in  order to 
complete  EU’s  law  provisions,  to  ensure  the  European  regulations’  observance  even  under  the 
compulsion of the judiciary system. But, most of the national measures bound on the EU’s executive 
function involving the execution of the European decisions by the national administrative apparatus. 
It comes to an indirect administration which interferes in the absence of an European descentralized 
administration, the EU Member States have the responsibility to ensure the administrative genuine 
execution of EU’s law by taking individual decisions and working out material acts
12.
Doctrine  evokes  even  the  existence  of  an  indirect  administration  principle,  officially 
proclaimed (but without a binding force) in the 43
th Declaration attached to Treaty of Amsterdam; 
according to it the enforcement of the community law, on an administrative plan, it devolves upon 
the Member States, in the main. Even more, on the background of the distinction between direct and 
indirect administration as an expression of the competences division which works in the EU and also 
considering  the  intensification  of  the  cooperation  between  national  and  European  authorities 
regarding the enforcement of the European policies – in the judicial practice – it is stated about the 
existence of a “co-administration”, a compound administration
13 or a divided (shared) execution
14,
some authors stating the existence of a new model
15.
Anyway,  direct  administration  represents  the  exception
16.  Concerning  the  indirect 
administration  rule,  besides  the  absence  of  a  community  field  administration  the  indirect 
administration bases on the proximity principle stated in the 1
st article EUT. According to it, EU’s 
decisions must be adopted as close as possible to the citizens ; thus, giving effectiveness to the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, at the same time and in the Member States’ favour. By 
this system of enforcement the European legislation, the Member States preserve a right of control 
regarding the enforcement of the EU law. 
elements of a legislative act. Non-legislative acts adopted by the Committee are named „delegated acts”. In the new 
treaty it is made a distinction between „delegated” acts and „execution” acts (stipulated in the article 291), the first 
corresponding to quasi-legislative measures and the latter to the execution measures stricto-sensu. These two types of 
acts have different significations and they exclude each other, an act adopted on the ground of article 290 is excluded 
from the domain of application of article 291, according to definitions and viceversa. 
9 Article 291(3) EUFT. 
10 Taken from the federal structures (for instance, Germany and Switzerland) where the local administrative 
authorities are charged with the enforcement of the measures adopted by the federal state. 
11 Dominique Ritleng, „L’identification de la function executive dans l’Union”, in L’execution du droit de 
l’Union, entre mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, ed. Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant 2009), 40. 
12 Idem.  
13 E. Schmidt-Assmann, „Le modele de l’administration composee et le rol du droit administratif europeenne”,
RFDA (2006) : 1246. 
14  Jacques  Ziller,  Execution  centralisee  et  execution  partagee,  in  L’execution  du  droit  de  l’Union,  entre 
mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, ed. Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, (Bruxelles: Bruylant 2009), 
114.
15 Jacques Ziller, „Les concepts d’administration directe, d’administration indirecte et de co-administration et 
les fondements du droit administratif europeenne”, in Droit administratif europeen, ed. J.- B. Auby, J. D. de la Roche 
(Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007), 235; Cl. Franchini, „Les notions d’administration indirecte et des co-administration ”, in 
Droit administratif europeen, ed. J.- B. Auby, J. D. de la Roche (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007), 245. 
16 It has been noticed a partial renationalization even in domains as the competition, as a consequence of the 
enactment of the 1
st Regulations/2003 - D. Ritleng, op. cit., p. 40. 541
The great role of the Member States in the enforcement of the European legislation did not 
have a specific description in the texts of the community treaties with the exception of some precise 
regulations, especially concerning the directives
17 and legal frame-decisions 
18 transposal and the 
provision of article 10 ECT (the former article 5 CEE) which stipulates: “The EU Member States 
take all general or special measures that are necessary to ensure carrying out the obligations which 
derive from the present treaty or result from the acts of the community institutions. EU Member 
States facilitate EU’s carrying out its mission. They abstain themselves from taking measures which 
could endanger the achievement of the present treaty’s goals”. 
In the absence of rigorous and exact regulations regarding the Member States’ role in the 
community law execution, the Court has brought a series of explanations which converge on the fact 
that this competence is not a simple prerogative but a genuine obligation
19. Thus, the Court has stated 
that “in accordance with the general principles which are the basis of the EU’s institutional system 
and  which  regulates  the relations  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  the  execution of  the 
community regulations appertains to the Member States in order to ensure the observance of the 
regulations in their jurisdictions, on the strength of article 5 EEC”
20. Furthermore, in its latest case-
law
21 the Court has stated that the national authorities must understand their own powers in a mode 
which ensures the most proper execution of the EU law. 
Treaty of Lisboa, taking over the corresponding stipulations from the constitutional Treaty 
Project, it brings a series of precise information regarding this issue. Thus, it ponts out for the first 
time that the Member States’ competence is a principle competence, EU could interfere if only an 
uniform regulation proves to be necessary
22. On the one hand in article 4 EUT is pointed out the 
principle of loyal cooperation which is compulsory for the Member States, on the other hand article 
291 EUFT states the following: “(1) The EU Member States take all legal measures in their domestic 
law that are necessary for the enforcement of the compulsory acts of EU. (2) In case that unitary 
conditions are needed in order to enforce the compulsory acts, then these acts give the Committee the 
execution competences or they give to the Council such competences in special and solid grounded 
cases and also in the cases stipulated in article 24 and article 26 from Treaty of Euroapean Union”.
2. The EU Member States’ autonomy in the enforcement of the European legislation 
The national authorities which interfere in the EU law enforcement always act “as bodies of a 
Member State”
23. On the strength of their statal character, they are not submitted to a hierarchic 
power of the European institutions. Therefore, the latter ones cannot send them instructions, they 
cannot replace them and also they cannot modify or repeal the decisions adopted by the national 
authorities
24.
In the enforcement of EU law, the Member States preserve an institutional and a procedural 
autonomy which is acknowledged even by the Court of Justice
25. This autonomy involves, in the 
17 Article 249 ECT. 
18 Article 34 EUT. 
19 Laetitia Guilloud, La loi dans l’Union Europeenne. Contribution a la definition des actes legislatifs dans un 
ordre juridique d’integration, (Paris, LGDJ, 2010), 119. 
20 Decision EECJ – 21
th September 1983, case Deutsche Milchkontor (conjunct cases 205-215/82), Rec. p. 
2633, point 17. Similar arguments can be found in other decisions of the Court: EECJ, 2
nd February 1989, Pays-
Bas/Comision, Case 262/87, Rec. 225; TPI, 4
th February 1998, Bernard Laga, Case T-93/95, Rec. II 195, p. 33. 
21 EECJ, 13
th March 2007, Unibet, Case C-432/05, Rec., p.2271, point 44. 
22  Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, Jean Rossetto, Droit  de l’Union Europeenne.  Institutions et  ordre juridique,
(Paris,. Montchrestien, Lextenso editions, 2010), 373. 
23 EECJ, 9
th March 1978, Case Simenthal, 106/77, Rec. p. 629 and following. The mention is made regarding 
the national judge. 
24 L. Guilloud, La loi dans l’Union Europeenne..., 119. 
25 Even if it has tried to limit it by time. 542  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
main, the fact that the protection of the rights acquired by the justiciables as a consequence of the 
community direct invoking regulations it is also ensured within the national legal systems by the 
domestic juridical instruments. As a consequence, national law is the one which decides the types 
and the powers of the authorities entitled to interfere. 
Thus,  the  institutional  and  procedural  autonomy  of  the  Member  States  represent  an 
“expression of a preserved sovereignity”
26. The concrete signification of this autonomy is that the 
Member States have  to lay  their means by which they  carry  out their  executive  mission at the 
disposal of the EU. But, they have the right to choose both the bodies charged with the execution and 
the proceedings and legal forms that are applicable for the enforcement of the EU law. 
2.1. The principle of institutional autonomy 
Although it is absent from the community treaties, this principle is considered by the doctrine 
as fundamental principle of the community legal order
27. The institutional autonomy of the Member 
States which involves their free choice regarding the bodies charged with the enforcement of the EU 
law, it is the result of the community case-law that identified this principle in International Fruit 
Company decision
28 and reiterated it many times, stating its importance. Thus, the Court considers 
that “in case that the provisions of the treaty or of the regulations give powers to Member States or 
they impose them obligations of enforcement the community law, then the matter to know in an 
explicite manner if their exercise of these powers and execution of these obligations can be entrusted 
to determined bodies by the member states, it is a problem that regards exclusively the constitutional 
systems of each member state”
29.
Therefore, it does not matter for the EU if the execution of the acts adopted by European 
institutions appertains to the executive or legislative member states’ authorities or if it is entrusted to 
the central or local agencies or to offices more or less autonomous in comparison with the state or to 
the local colectivities. The member states cand even entrust the execution to private persons or to 
legal private law entities, but under the condition of disposing of means in order to ensure that they 
carry out their missions observing the EU law
30. It is considered that “ensuring the obervance of the 
community norms in their jurisdictions appertains to the member states’ authorities, whether it comes 
to central statal power authorities, to federal authorities or to other territorial authorities”
31. The Court 
stated  that  this  principle  is  applicable  inclusively  in  the  case  of  exclusive  competences  of  the 
community
32.
Not only the appointment of the national competent authorities but also the selection of the 
national competent jurisdictions is submitted to the principle of institutional autonomy
33. In this 
respect, the Court stated that “the appointment of the competent jurisdictions to settle the litigations 
that involve individual rights derived from the community juridical order belongs to the legal order 
of each state, but, however it is established that the member states have the responsibility to ensure 
an effective protection of these rights, in every case”
34.
26 R. Mehdi, L’autonomie institutionelle et procedurale et le droit administratif, in L’execution du droit de 
l’Union, entre mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, ed. J.- B. Auby, J. D. de la Roche (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
2007), 687. 
27 Laurent Malo, Autonomie locale et Union europeenne, (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010), 349. 
28 EECJ, 15
th December 1971, International Fruit Company, Cases 51-54/71, Rec., p. 1116 and following. 
29 3
rd point from International Fruit Company Court’s decision, mentioned above. 
30  Jacques  Ziller,  Execution  centralisee  et  execution  partagee,  în  L’execution  du  droit  de  l’Union,  entre 
mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, sous la direction de J. D. de la Rochere, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2009, 
p. 126. 
31 EECJ, 12
th June 1990, RFG/Commision, Case C-8/88, Rec. p I-2321 and next, point 113. 
32 EECJ, decision Sukkerfabriken, case 151/70, Rec., p. 1. 
33 EECJ, 19
thDecember 1968, Societe Salgoil/ Ministere du comerce exterieur de la Republique italiene, Case 
3/68, Rec., p. 661. 
34 EECJ, 9
th July 1985, Piercarlo Bozzetti/ Invernizzi SpA, Case 179/84, Rec., p. 2301, point 17. 543
2.2 The procedural autonomy of the EU member states 
The  autonomy  of  the  member  states  concerning  the  exercise  of  their  EU  law  execution 
function is not only an institutional one but also they are acknowledged a procedural autonomy 
which consists in the fact that the domestic legal bodies charged with the execution determine the 
acts which must be adopted and the enforcement legal proceedings. 
So as the institutional autonomy, procedural autonomy’s founding and establishment derives 
from a case-law work. At the beginning of the case-law the community judge limited to offer a 
minimal level of orientation in this matter
35 and he stated that the mode of protection of the rights 
belonging to a person unfavourably affected by the infringement of the community law appertains to 
the national legal system
36. Later on, the community judge has given a series of explanations, stating 
that the enforcement of the EU law is made by the member states with the observance of the legal 
proceedings and forms stipulated by their national law
37.
Procedural autonomy enforces equally to domestic jurisdictions charged with the enforcement 
of the EU law insofar as the member states are the only competent concerning the legal solutions 
determination. On the basis of their national law, they have to establish the competent jurisdictions, 
the means of attack and the rules of writing summons and of development in front of the instances. 
The Court stated that the national judge has to select “from the different proceedings of the juridical 
domestic  order  those  which  are  proper  for  the  protection  of  individual  rights  conffered  by  the 
community law”
38. Recently it considered that the national judge must ensure the full effectiveness of 
these  regulations,  removing  if  necessary  any  application  of  a  national  contrary  provision
39
(inclusively a procedural norm
40) without requesting or waiting the elimination of that provision by a 
legislative method or by other constitutional proceedings. 
However, procedural law of the member states is not harmonized so that a competence of the 
EU should be necessary. Considering all these, the Court had to give up the approach in case that 
community regulations in this matter do not exist, then the responsibility to determine the conditions 
of protection of the rights deriving from the EU regulations appertains to the member states. Thus, 
the Court has imposed two “community” legal requests concerning the national conditions
41: the 
request of equivalency and the request of the national means effectiveness regarding the enforcement 
of the EU law. Under the condition of carrying out these requests, the EU member states must 
determine the  competent authorities and the procedural methods to ensure the protection of the 
justiciables’ rights conffered by the community law
42. The EU member states are not obliged, in the 
main, to set up other legal measures to ensure the observance of the national law
43 than the existing 
ones, under the condition that these measures mustn’t affect exercise of law in the legal practice
44.
35 Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca, EU law. Comments, case-law and doctrine, (Bucharest, Hamangiu, 2009), 
382.
36 Decisions Humblot/Belgium (Case 6/60, ECR 559) or Societe Salgoil (mentioned before). 
37 EECJ, 11
th February 1971, Norddeutsches Vieh und Fleischkontor/Hauptzollamt Hamburg St. Annen, Case 
39/70, Rec. p. 48. 
38 EECJ, 4
th April 1968, Gebruder Luck/ Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau, Case 34/67, Rec., p. 359.
39 To be seen in this respect decision on 9
th March 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, Rec., p. 629, point 24 and also 
decision on 19
th November 2009, Filipiak, C-314/08, unpublished in the summary of case-law. 
40 Court’s decision on 5
th October 2010, case Elchinov, C-173/09, unpublished. 
41 P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU law..., 384. 
42 To be seen in this respect, EECJ, 16
th December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz  i Rewe-Zentral, Case 33/76, 
Rec. p. 1989, point 5; EECJ, 14
th December 1995, Peterbroeck, Case C-312/93, Rec. I-4599, point. 12; EECJ 13
th
March 2007, Unibet, Case C-432/05, Rec. p. I-2271, point 39 and EECJ, 12
th February 2008, Kempter, Case C-2/06, 
Rec. p. I-411, point 57. 
43 Thus the enforcement of EU law does not “overturn” the national law system but it brings to it a series of 
adjustments - Claude Blumann, Louis Dubouis, Droit institutionnel de l´Union Européenne, (Paris, Litec, 2007), 578. 
44  EECJ,  2
nd  February  1988,  Barra/Belgium,  Case  309/85,  Rec.  355;  EECJ,  11
th  July  2002, 
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3. Limitations of the institutional and procedural autonomy of the EU member states 
The necessity of ensuring a unitary application and of guaranteeing an effective protection of 
the rights deriving from the community norms, especially because of the increasement diversity of 
the national systems as a consequence of the successive accessions, it has determined the progressive 
introduction of some case-law limitations regarding the institutional and procedural autonomy of the 
member states. As it is stated in the doctrine, “the dialectics autonomy/uniformity represents the 
essence of the juridical integration process”
45.
The recourse at the national institutions in order to ensure the enforcement of EU law makes 
that its efectiveness depends on the efectiveness of the statal authorities. Under these circumstances, 
the pronouncement of contrary solutions in the enforcement of EU law seems to be predictable. 
These solutions are contrary to the principle of the law rule and of the uniform enforcement of the 
EU law and they justify, on the one hand the limitation made by the Committee as a “guardian of 
treaties”  and  on  the  other  hand  the  limitations  made  by  the  European  judge  concerning  the 
enforcement methods
46. Thus, the rules of conduct which are compulsory for the member states in 
the exercise of their execution competences are clearly defined
47.
Concerning the principle of the institutional autonomy of the member states, its limits result 
from the fact that no matter the independence degree of the legal bodies charged with EU’s law 
policies execution, the state is responsible for the effectivity of this execution and for the observance 
of the principles and provisions stipulated in the treaties, in the Court of Justice case-law and in the 
derived law
48. At the same time, member states are responsible for the injuries caused to private 
persons as a consequence of the EU law infringement, no matter the statal body that infringed it
49.
This responsibility was stated by Francovich decisions
50 and also in the later case-law based on it
51.
The EU member states have a sovereign competence to establish the legal bodies charged 
with the enforcement of EU law and their powers. But, member states do not have a complete 
freedom  of  appreciation.  Their  autonomies  are  directed  and  controlled  in  order  to  avoid  the 
deviations which may lead to the infringement of EU law. 
The European Committee is the one that guards the legal and correct enforcement of the 
community law by the member states. This competence of “guardian of treaties” is stipulated in the 
article 17 from EUT (“…The Committee supervises the enforcement of EU law under the control of 
the European Court of Justice.”) and it was completed by the Court’s case law which stated the 
existence of a “general supervision competence” which allows it to guard the manner the member 
states observe their obligations which result from the treaties and their decisions taken in order to 
enforce them
52.
The Committee has preventive competences such as the right of information which result 
from  various  provisions  of  the  treaty  completed  by  enlarged  verification  competences  or  even 
repressive ones (as it happens in the competitional law concerning the state aids (grants)). 
45 Denis Simon, Le sisteme juridique communautaire, (Paris, PUF, 2001), 157. 
46 L. Guilloud, La loi ...,125.
47 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’Union Europeenne …, 376. 
48 Jacques Ziller, Execution centralisee et execution partagee..., 127. 
49 EECJ, 5
th March 1996, Braserie du pecheur  i Factorame, Conjunct cases C-46/93,  i C-48/93, Rec., p. I-
1029.
50 EECJ, 19
th November 1991, Francovich  i Bonifaci, Cases C. 6/90  i C. 9/90, Rec, I-5402. 
51 The principle of states’ responsibility for the infringement of the community law has been admitted since 
1960, EECJ stating conclusions regarding the redress obligation. In decision Humblot/Belgium (Case 6/60, ECR 559), 
the  Court  considered  that  if  she  states  in  a  decision  that  a legislative  or  an  administrative  act deriving  from  the 
authorities of a member state is contrary to community law, then that state is obliged to repeal it and to repair its illicit 
effects, on the ground of article 86 CECO. 
52 EECJ, 5
th May 1981, Commission/Olanda, Case 804/79, Rec. p. 1045. 545
Regarding  the  procedural  autonomy  of  the  member  states,  the  Court  has  stated  that  the 
reference to the national legal rules works in the absence of stipulations which should harmonize 
national law procedure existing in the community law. National judges cannot apply to the actions 
based on the infringement of the community law norms more severe legal rules than those applied to 
national actions with the same object (the principle of equivalency/of national treatment)
53 and in all 
cases the protection ensured for the justiciables must be effective (the principle of effectiveness)
54.
As a consequence, national jurisdictions must ensure the enforcement of the EU law with the same 
effectiveness and rigour as they do it for the enforcement of the national law
55.
Concerning the principle of equivalency, we mention that according to a constant case-law all 
the legal rules applicable to actions should be applied without a distinction both to actions derived 
from the infringement of EU law and to actions derived from the non-observance of the domestic 
law
56. However, this principle does not oblige a member state to enlarge its most favourable legal 
treatments concerning all the actions introduced in a certain law domain
57.
4. The procedural autonomy of the member states concerning the European judicial 
framework 
In a general point of view, the enforcement of the EU law hasn’t brought great alterations in 
the national legal system. Despite the absence of the community procedural norms the member states 
have procedural autonomy on the condition of the observance of the principles of equivalency and 
effectiveness (analysed before). The enforcement of Treaty of Amsterdam has created a particular 
situation concerning the European judicial framework. Article 29 from EUT (and article 61 ECT) 
stipulates  the  target  of  establishing  a  framework  based  on liberty,  security  and  justice with  the 
observance of the fundamental rights and of the different law systems and their juridical customs. 
But, by introducing article 65 in ECT the processual law – as it was stated in the doctrine – it became 
a self-objective of the community construction
58. This text is resumed in Treaty of Lisboa (article 81 
EUFT) and it stipulates the enactment of measures in the civil juridical cooperation with cross-border 
implications. The 2
nd paragraph, letter f) provides that it comes to the “elimination of the obstacles 
regarding the normal developpment of civil procedural rules enforced in the member states”. The 
main objectives in this domain are the juridical security and the free access to justice equality which 
involves various aspects: an easier identification of the competent jurisdiction, a clear indication of 
the enforceable law, the existence of fast and equitable trials and also the existence of effective 
execution proceedings. Legal proceedings must conffer to private persons the same guarantees thus 
53 To be seen, EECJ, 12
th September 2006, Case Cauza Eman and Sevinger/ College van Burgemeester en 
Wethouders van Den Haag, C-300/2004, ECR I-8055. 
54 EECJ, 9
th July, Case Bozetti, mentioned before. 
55 In the decision pronnounced in case Rewe, the Court states that “any type of action provided by the national 
law must be used to ensure the observance of the community norms which have a direct effect in the same conditions of 
admissibility and procedure which ensure the enforcement of the national law” - Case Rewe Handelgesellschaft Nord 
MBH and others, Aff. 158/80, Rec. p. 1805. 
56 To be seen in this respect decision from 15
th September 1998, Edis, C-231/96, Rec., p. I-4951, point 36, 
decision on 1
st December 1998, Levez, C-326/96, Rec., p. I-7835, point 41, decision on 16
th May 2000, Preston and 
other, C-78/98, Rec., p. I-3201, punctul 55, Decision on 19
th September 2006, i-21 Germany and Arcor, C-392/04 and 
C-422/04,  Rec.,  p.  I-8559,  point  62  and  also  Decision  on  26
th  January  2010,  Transportes  Urbanos  y  Servicios 
Generales, unpublished, point 33. 
57  Decision  Levez,  mentioned  before,  point  42,  decision  Transportes  Urbanos  y  Servicios  Generales 
(mentioned), point 34. 
58 Mathias Audit, Autonomie procedurale et espace judiciaire europeen, în L’execution du droit de l’Union, 
entre mecanismes communautaires et droits nationaux, ed. Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, (Bruxelles: Bruylant 
2009), 254. 546  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
the  legal  treatment  shouldn’t  be  unequal  amongst  the  different  jurisdictions.  The  rules  may  be 
different but they must be equivalent one to another. 
The doctrine states with good reason
59 that once with the European judicial framework the 
principle of procedural autonomy is redefined; this principle is “diluted” in this legal framework 
because of the intrinsic incompatibility between the common procedural norms and the preservation 
of the national processual laws. Basing on the stipulations mentioned above, a common procedural 
law is wanted to be developped in order to replace the national provisions enforced in this matter 
(inclusively regarding the competence, the procedure or the effects of the judicial decisions)
60.
The Court of Justice has brought its contribution to the unity of the European procedural law. 
The Court considered that a certain uniformity or at least an equivalency between the domestic 
procedural laws is required
61.
In any case, at the present moment it can be discussed only about a minimal approach in the 
procedural domain for cross-border cases and not about a material law, at least for the moment. It’s 
obvious that certain domains are very sensitive and some of the EU member states insist on the fact 
that the EU should not exceed its competences in these domains. On the other hand, the judicial 
cooperation based on the mutual recognition involves the existence of a mutual trust which can be 
realized only by a minimal harmonization of the procedural and enforcement legal rules. As a overall 
view, the principle of procedural autonomy in the domain of the European judicial framework is 
being  seriously  discussed,  national  procedural  laws  must  be  subordinated  to  this  framework 
formation. According to the doctrine, a possible “fracture” of the processual law could interfere, 
which could  also involve  a  complication  both  for the judge  and  for  the  justiciables. Thus,  two 
processual laws would coexist in front of the national judge: a specific one which is enforceable in 
intra-community litigations and it is common to all member states and a national law enforceable to 
any other types of litigations
62.
5. Conclusions 
A proper and a correct enforcement of the EU legislation is essential for the maintenance of a 
solid basis of the EU and it also important for the achievement of the exepcted European policies 
impact. The construction of an autonomous legal order of the EU completed with the national legal 
orders and with an extremely complex and coherent case-law hadn’t been enough in order to ensure 
the effective enforcement of the EU law. In this respect, there are necessary more combined efforts of 
the EU institutions and of the member states in order to achieve this goal. 
Nowadays, the enforcement of the EU law has to cope with great challenges. For a long time, 
the  Community  and  the  Union  performed  in  their  legislative  competence,  they  increased  their 
normative production and they offered it a binding force in the member states’ territories; thus, they 
hoped to get closer to carryout the fixed goals. At the present moment it is considered that this 
legislative abundance has complicated the acknowledge and the enforcement of the European norms, 
thus the legal system became complex and to a certain extent it becam unenforceable. Under these 
circumstances, working out of some operational enforcement criteria and creating new enforcement 
instruments prove to be necessary in order to offer effectiveness to EU legislation. It comes to limit 
59 M. Audit, Autonomie procedurale et espace judiciaire europeen...
60 The enactment of various instruments which institute a series of European proceedings is explanatory; for 
instance: the European executory title (Regulations 805/2004),, the proceeding of European writ of debt (Regulations 
1896/2006) or the regulations of little conflicts (Regulations 861/2007). 
61 To be seen, EECJ, 8
th May 2003, Gantner, Case C-111/01 or EECJ, 27
th April 2004, Turner/Grovit, Case C-
159/02, Rev. 654. 
62 M. Audit, Autonomie procedurale et espace judiciaire europeen...,260-261. According to the author, the 
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the legislative production and to improve its effectiveness thus charging the member states with 
enlarged obligations in concordance with the EU law
63.
Generally speaking, it can be stated that the EU’s law execution principally bases on the 
Member  States  competences  which  are  exercised  according  to  the  institutional  and  procedural 
autonomy principles developped by the community case-law but, at the same time respecting the 
cooperation and loialty obligations. It comes to an indirect administration which interferes in the 
absence of an European descentralized administration, the EU Member States have the responsibility 
to  ensure  the  administrative  genuine  execution  of  EU’s  law  by  taking  individual  decisions  and 
working  out  material  acts.  The  method  of  enforcement  the  European  legislation  reasserts  a 
fundamental descentralization principle, establishing an “executive federalism” – as it has been stated 
in the doctrine. On the strength of it, if the legislative function is prevailingly controlled by the 
institutions, then the legislative acts’ executions falls on the Member States, on the ground of a self-
competence or a delegated one (it concerns an exclusive community competence). 
As a consequence of the explanations brought by Treaty of Lisboa (article 291 EUFT) it can 
be stated that the member states are the titulars of the EU executive function. This competence of the 
member states represent a general principle. The intervention of the European institutions can be only 
subsidiary because they have a limited competence. The very necessity of an uniform execution of 
the EU acts justifies and imposes the entrusting of these obligations to the European echelon
64.
In the enforcement of EU law, the Member States preserve an institutional and a procedural 
autonomy which is acknowledged even by the Court of Justice. This autonomy involves, in the main, 
the  fact  that  the  protection  of  the  rights  acquired  by  the  justiciables  as  a  consequence  of  the 
community direct invoking regulations it is also ensured within the national legal systems by the 
domestic juridical instruments. As a consequence, national law is the one which decides the types 
and the powers of the authorities entitled to interfere. 
Thus,  the  institutional  and  procedural  autonomy  of  the  Member  States  represent  an 
“expression of a preserved sovereignity”
65. The concrete signification of this autonomy is that the 
Member States have  to lay  their means by which they  carry  out their  executive  mission at the 
disposal of the EU. But, they have the right to choose both the bodies charged with the execution and 
the proceedings and legal forms that are applicable for the enforcement of the EU law. 
The necessity of ensuring a unitary application and of guaranteeing an effective protection of 
the rights deriving from the community norms, especially because of the increasement diversity of 
the national systems as a consequence of the successive accessions, it has determined the progressive 
introduction of some case-law limitations regarding the institutional and procedural autonomy of the 
member  states.  Thus,  the  rules  of  conduct  which  are  compulsory  for  the  member  states  in  the 
exercise of their execution competences are clearly defined, their autonomy is directed and controlled 
in order to avoid the deviations that can lead to the infringement of the EU law. 
A particular situation has been noticed in the European judicial framework. This domain has 
registered the greatest evolutions in the last years.  It is also an important uniformization of the 
procedural law of the member states, existing the possibility to turn it into a common processual law 
which should replace the national legal rules applicable in this matter. The problem which interferes 
in this case is that of a national processual law halving which involves the existence of two categories 
of laws: some of them enforceable to intra-unional litigations which is common to all member states 
and other laws enforceable to other types of litigations which could overturn the national judicial 
system. A solution that should be taken into consideration is that of a determined uniformization of 
the processual law of the member states; thus the EU law could become a standard law for the 
63 L. Azoulai, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
64 D. Ritleng, op. cit., p. 49. 
65  R.  Mehdi,  L’autonomie  institutionelle  et  procedurale  et  le  droit  administratif,  in  Droit  administratif 
europeen, ed. J.- B. Auby, J. D. de la Roche (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007), 687. 548  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
procedural law of the member states
66. However, it’s obvious that such a proposal is subordinated to 
the future developments in this matter and we should take into consideration that these evolutions 
depend on the political will of the member states, in a great extent. 
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